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In economics the main efﬁciency criterion is that of Pareto-optimality. For prob-
lems of distributing a social endowment a central notion of fairness is no-envy (each
agent should receive a bundle atleast asgood, according toher ownpreferences, asany
of the other agent’s bundle). For most economies there are multiple allocations satisfy-
ing these two properties. We provide a procedure, based on distributional implications
of these two properties, which selects a single allocation which is Pareto-optimal and
satisﬁes no-envy in two-agent exchange economies. There is no straightforward gen-
eralization of our procedure to more than two-agents.Recursive no-envy
In the economics literature on fair allocation one central equity concept is no-envy
(Foley 1967), each agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to her own
preferences, as any of the other agent’s bundle.1 Starting with Varian (1974) different
allocation rules have been proposed which select envy-free and efﬁcient allocations in ex-
change economies.2 One proposal which selects an envy-free allocation is by means of an
iterative procedure based on partial assignment of most preferred allocations within the set
of envy-free allocations (Baumol 1982). Unfortunately, this procedure may fail to select an
efﬁcient allocation (Philpotts 1983). We propose a modiﬁcation to Baumol’s (1982) pro-
posal, based on partial assignment of most preferred allocations within the set of efﬁcient
and envy-free allocations, and show that under mild conditions it selects an efﬁcient and
envy-free allocation for two-agent exchange economies.
Our rule is based on strengthening the no-envy condition in a recursive manner. First,
we deﬁne the “minimal right of each agent” as the minimal amounts of commodities that
she receives at any envy-free and efﬁcient allocation. Then, if all members of society agree
that an envy-free and efﬁcient allocation should be selected, they implicitly agree that each
agent should receive at least her minimal right and we can assign these to each agent. Once
minimal rights have been assigned we can focus on distributing the resources remaining
after such assignment. Then, it is only natural to try to distribute these resources in an
envy-free and efﬁcient way; but then we can apply the same argument calculate minimal
rights, assigned them and proceed recursively until minimal rights are zero. We show that,
for two-agent economies, (i) assigning to each agent her minimal right guarantees that the
ﬁnal allocation will be envy-free, and (ii) iterated assignment of minimal rights process
leads to an (envy-free and) efﬁcient allocation.
Thisresultisincontrastwithsomepreviousresultsinthefairallocationliteraturewhere
a society may start from an inefﬁcient envy-free allocation, engage in “envy-free trades”,
1When an allocation satisﬁes no-envy we say that it is an envy-free allocation.
2For a survey of the fair allocation literature see Thomson (2007).
2and end up in an efﬁcient allocation where there is envy (Feldman and Kirman 1974). This
result shows that sometimes “adding” to an initially fair allocation a fair transition, where
the same notion of fairness is applied to the initial state and the transition, leads to an unfair
ﬁnal result. In our procedure this is not the case, we can think of each agent receiving her
minimal right as a transition principle and our results show that recursively applying this
transition principle leads to a fair ﬁnal outcome. Each agent starts receiving nothing, which
is a fair envy-free initial state; then, at each step of the process each agent receives a her
minimal right which deﬁnes an envy-free allocation (thus, no agent could object to such
assignment on the basis of envy) and is a fair transition; but then, the cumulative amounts
received up to that step deﬁne a new initial state which we show it is envy-free in the
original economy and thus a fair initial state to which we can apply the transition principle,
our results show that in the limit we obtain a fair and efﬁcient allocation.
The idea of distributing each agent’s minimal rights and iterating this procedure until
the entire endowment is assigned to the agents resembles the idea of a gradual process
which is already present in the bargaining literature. The idea of gradualism in bargaining
ﬁrstly appear in the seminal paper of Admati and Perry (1991). More recently, Compte and
Jehiel (2003) presents a model in which gradualism derives from reciprocal concessions
that agents make under the threat of inefﬁcient termination option. For cake division prob-
lems Nicol` o and Yu (forthcoming) propose, in a fair division game, an iterated version of
the divide and choose rule, previously analzyed by Crawford (1977), in which an envy-free
and efﬁcient allocation is reached after a step by step procedure.
Our procedure can also be interpreted as a non-manipulability of a distribution rule
with respect to assignment of minimal rights. Since both agents agree that the other should
receive her minimal rights, when faced with a speciﬁc distribution problem an arbitrator
can decide to apply a distribution rule directly, or to ﬁrst assign to each agent her minimal
right (over which there is no conﬂict of interest) and then apply the rule to the remaining
resources. In order to avoid manipulability of the procedure it is desirable to ask that
3the rule selects the same allocation no matter which of these two options the arbitrator
chooses; it is easy to see that ourrule is theonlyrule which satisﬁes thisnon-manipulability
property. In bakruptcy problems this invariance property is widely accepted (Aumann and
Maschler1985)itsaysthataruleshouldrecommendthesameawardswhenapplieddirectly
to a problem, or ﬁrst assigning minimal rights and then applied to a reduced problem.3 In
bankruptcy invariance under minimal rights does not select a single award vector since in
the second step minimal rights are not positive.4
The fact that our rule selects an efﬁcient allocation is obtained by considering only
efﬁcient allocations when deﬁning minimal rights, it can be generalized for more than
two agents. The fact that it selects an envy-free allocation is obtained by noting that, for
two-agent economies, no-envy can be simpliﬁed to comparing each agent’s bundle with
the remaining resources,5 and then, assigning minimal rights in the ﬁrst step guarantees
no-envy of the ﬁnal allocation. For economies with more than two-agents this reasoning
fails, envy (or lack of envy) by one agent depends not only on what she receives but on
the distribution of the remaining resources among the remaining agents; moreover, after
assigning minimal rights in the ﬁrst step, envy may arise after distributing the remaining
resources in the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains the model, Section 2
contains the results for two-agent economies, and in Section 4 we conclude and discuss
some possible extensions for economies with more than two agents.
3In bankruptcy an agent’s minimal right is given by the amount of the resource not claimed by the other
agents,
4The invariance property has been studied applied to other notions of rights by Dom´ ınguez and Thomson
(2006) and Dom´ ınguez (2007) and found that for some properties it does select a single award vector.
5Efﬁciency implies that all the resources are distributed among the agents.
41 The model
There is a social endowment W ∈ Rm
++ of M = {1,...,m} commodities to be distributed
among a set N = {A,B} of agents.6 Each agent can consume non-negative amounts of
each commodity, for each agent i ∈ N her consumption set is Xi = Rm
+. We refer to
agent i’s vector of consumption xi ∈ Xi as her bundle. Each agent i ∈ N has a continu-
ous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex preference relation Ri over her consumption
set.7 We assume that preferences satisfy the following decreasing marginal rate of sub-
stitution condition: Let x,x′ ∈Xi such that x  =x′, and x  x′ and x  x′, let p and p′ denote
any supporting prices of the upper contour sets of R at x and x′ respectively. Then, for each
commodity j,k ∈ M, such that xj ≥ x′
j and xk ≤ x′
k, the relative prices between commod-







.8 The set of all such preferences is denoted R . A proﬁle of
preferences is R = (RA,RB) ∈ R 2, an economy is a pair (R,W) ∈E =R 2×Rm
++.
An allocation x = (xA,xB) ∈ ×i∈NXi assigns to each agent a bundle xi ∈ Xi. The set
of all possible allocations is denoted X = ×i∈NXi. An allocation x ∈ X is feasible for the
economy(R,W)ifåi∈Nxi ≤W, thatis, theaggregateendowmentisenoughtoassigntoeach
agent her bundle. For each economy (R,W) ∈ E we denote its set of feasible allocations
Z(R,W). A feasible allocation x ∈ Z(R,W) is efﬁcient for the economy (R,W) if there is
no feasible allocation x′ ∈ Z(R,W) such that, for each i ∈ N, x′
i Ri xi, and for some i ∈ N,
x′
i Pi xi. For each economy (R,W)∈E we denote its set of efﬁcient allocations P(R,W). For
each agent i ∈ N the projection of the set P(R,W) onto her consumption space is denoted
Pi(R,W),9 it consists of all bundles xi ∈ Xi such that (xi,W−xi) ∈ P(R,W).10
6The set R+ is the set of non-negativereals and the set R++ is the set of positivereals. Vectorinequalities:
x ≧ y ⇔ for each i ∈ N, xi ≥ yi. x ≥ y ⇔ x ≧ y and x  = y. x > y ⇔ for each i ∈ N, xi > yi.
7Given a preference relation R, we denote strict preference by P and indifference by I.
8Even though decreasing marginal rates of substitution states that the greater-than relation between rel-
ative prices of commodity j in terms of commodity k is independent of the consumption levels of other
commodities, the level of the relative prices may depend on the consumption levels of other commodities. A
sufﬁcient condition for preferences to satisfy decreasing marginal rates of substitution is that preferences are
both convex and homothetic.
9Throughout the paper we use the following notation: Given a set of allocations S ⊂ X, the set Si ⊂ Xi
denotes the projection of S onto agent i’s consumption space.
10Note that by strict monotonicityof preferences if an allocation is efﬁcient it distributes the social endow-
5An allocation x = (xA,xB) satisﬁes no-envy (or is envy-free) for the economy (R,W) if
each agent is at least as well off consuming her bundle than consuming the other agent’s
bundle, that is, for each i, j ∈ N, xi Ri xj. For each economy (R,W) ∈ E we denote its set
of envy-free allocations F(R,W). The set of envy-free and efﬁcient allocations is denoted
PF(R,W) and consists of the intersection of the sets P(R,W) and F(R,W).
We are interested in recommending to each economy an allocation. An allocation rule
(or just a rule) j : E → Z(R,w),11 is a function from the set of economies into its set of
feasible allocations. A rule is efﬁcient if for each economy it recommends an efﬁcient
allocation, it satisﬁes no-envy if for each economy it recommends an envy-free allocation.
1.1 Preliminaries
We now provide some preliminary results on envy-free and efﬁcient allocations. Our ﬁrst
result is well-known in the literature and was shown by Varian (1974).12
Remark 1. For each (R,W)∈E the set of envy-free and efﬁcient allocations is a non-empty
and closed set.
Given decreasing marginal rates of substitution, starting from an efﬁcient allocation
and moving to another feasible allocation in which each agent obtains a bundle which is
no larger nor smaller than her original bundle each of the agent’s supporting prices move
opposite directions. Thus, the new allocation can not be efﬁcient and each agent’s set of
efﬁcient bundles deﬁnes an increasing curve in consumption space.
Remark 2. For each (R,W) ∈ E, the efﬁcient set deﬁnes an increasing curve in the Edge-
worth box, that is, if two distinct allocations (xA,xB),(x′
A,x′
B) ∈ P(R,W) then, either (i)
xA ≥ x′
A, or (ii) xA ≤ x′
A.
ment fully.
11We ask that a rule selects a single feasible allocation, one possibility for generalizing our results to more
than two agents is to consider allocation correspondences.
12For economies without production the Walrasian rule operated from an equal distribution of the endow-
ment leads to an envy-free allocation (since all agents face the same budget set), and by the ﬁrst welfare
theorem this allocation is also efﬁcient.
6Proof. Let (R,W) ∈ E, and by contradiction assume that there exists (xA,xB),(x′
A,x′
B) ∈
P(R,W) such that xA   x′
A and xA   x′
A. Let p,p′ ∈ Rm
++ denote some supporting prices
of RA at xA and x′
A respectively, and q,q′ ∈ Rm
++ be supporting prices of RB at xB and x′
B
respectively. Since (xA,xB) and (x′
A,x′
B) are efﬁcient, we can ﬁnd supporting prices such
that p = q and p′ = q′.
First we show that the relative prices between any two commodities that move in op-
posite directions from xA to x′
A remain the same. Let j,k ∈ M be such that xAj ≥ x′
Aj and
xAk ≤ x′
Ak. By efﬁciency the full endowment is consumed, hence we have xBj ≤ x′
Bj and
xBk ≥ x′












































Now we show that the relative prices between any two commodities that move in the
same direction from xA to x′
A remain the same. Let k,l ∈ M be such that xAk ≥ x′
Ak and
xAl ≥ x′
Al. Let j be such that xAj ≤ x′
Aj (such j exists since xA   x′
A and x′























Hence, supporting prices of RA at xA and x′
A are the same, that is p = p′ = q = q′.
Finally, let x′′
A ∈ box(xA,x′
A) be such that x′′
A  = xA and x′′
A IA xA.13 Such x′′
A exists by
continuity of preferences. By decreasing marginal rates of substitution and using the same
argument as above moving from x′′
A to xA and x′
A respectively lead to changes in supporting
prices in weakly opposite directions; but given the equality of such prices remain constant.
Thus xA IA x′′
A and supporting prices of RA at x′′
A and x′′
A are the same, which contradicts
strict convexity of preferences.
2 Envy-free and efﬁcient minimal rights
Given an economy (R,W) no-envy and efﬁciency restrict the bundles that each agent can
receive. For each agent i ∈ N, the set of potential envy-free and efﬁcient bundles,
13For each x,x′ ∈ RMM the set box(x,x′) = {y ∈ RM : for eachj ∈ M, min{xj,x′












Figure 1: Minimal rights. The minimal rights of each agent i are denoted mi. Given decreasing marginal
rates of substitution the Pareto set deﬁnes an increasing curvein the Edgeworthbox. Each agent is indifferent
between consuming her minimal right mi and the remaining resources (w−mi). Each agent’s minimal right
is part of an efﬁcient allocation.
PFi(R,W), consists on all bundles xi ∈ Xi such that (xi,W−xi) ∈ PF(R,W). Each bun-
dle xi ∈ PFi(R,W) requires different amounts of each commodity, the minimal rights of
an agent are given by the minimum amounts of each commodity that she receives at any
envy-free allocation (see ﬁgure 1).
Deﬁnition 1. For each (R,W) ∈E, each i ∈ N and each k ∈ M,
i. Agent i’s minimal right of commodity k is mik(R,W) = inf{xk : there exists x−k ∈
RM−1
+ , (xk,x−k) ∈ PFi(R,W)}.
ii. Agent i’s minimal rights are mi(R,W) = (mik(R,W))k∈M.
iii. The economy’s minimal rights are m(R,W) = (mi(R,W))i∈N.
It iseasy toseethatforeach economyitsminimalrightsdeﬁneanenvy-freeandfeasible
allocation. As the next proposition shows, for each agent the allocation which assigns to
that agent her minimal rights and the remainder to the other agent is an envy-free and
efﬁcient allocation (see Figure 1).
Proposition1. Foreach(R,W)∈E andeachi∈N, theallocation(mi(R,W),W−mi(R,W)),
is envy-free and efﬁcient.
8Proof. Let (R,W) ∈ E and i ∈ N. We need to show that mi(R,W) ∈ PFi(R,W).
For each commodity k ∈ M there exists a sequence of bundles {xn
ik}n∈N ∈ PFi(R,W)
such that xn
ik → mik(R,W). Let X(k) be the set of elements of such sequence and let X =
S
k∈MX(k). By Proposition 2 the efﬁcient set deﬁnes an increasing curve, therefore, we can
order the elements of X in a decreasing sequence, let {xn}n∈N be such decreasing sequence.
Then, for each n ∈ N, xn ∈ PFi(R,W) and xn → mi(R,W). Since the set PFi(R,W) is closed
then mi(R,W) ∈ PFi(R,W).
The intuitionbehindProposition1 issimple: sincetheefﬁcient set deﬁnes an increasing
curve in the Edgeworth box, agent i’s minimal rights of each good are obtained from the
same allocation, and therefore are part of an efﬁcient and envy-free allocation.
The next corollary is one of the main results of the paper. If we assign to each agent
her minimal rights then, no matter how we distribute the remaining resources, we obtain an
envy-free allocation.
Corollary 1. For each (R,W) ∈ E and each x ∈ Z(R,W), if x ≥ m(R,W) then x ∈ F(R,W).
Proof. Let (R,W)∈E, i∈N, and x∈Z(R,W) such that x≥m(R,W). Since x∈Z(R,W), by
Proposition 1, xj ≤ W−xi. Moreover, since xi ≥ mi(R,W) then xj ≤ W−mi(R,W). Hence,
xi Ri mi(R,W) Ri (W−mi(R,W)) Ri xj.
Thus, for each i ∈ N we have xi Ri xj, and therefore x ∈ F(R,W).
The next corollary shows that, if in the economy there is a positiveamount of resources,
each agent’s minimal rights are positive.
Corollary 2. For each (R,W) ∈ E with W ≥ 0,14 and each i ∈ N, mi(R,W) ≥ 0, moreover
for each i ∈ N there exists a commodity k ∈ M such that mik(R,W) ≥
Wk
2 > 0.
14 The notation W ≥ 0 is used for W ≥ (0,...,0).
9Proof. We show that mi(R,W) = 0 ⇒ W = 0.
Let (R,W) ∈ E, and i ∈ N. By Proposition 1 we have mi(R,W) Ri (W−mi(R,W)).
Suppose that mi(R,W) = 0, then, 0 Ri W. By monotonicity of preferences W = 0.
To show that there exists a commodity k ∈ M such that mik(R,W) ≥
Wk
2 > 0, assume by
contradiction that for each k ∈ M with Wk > 0, mik(R,W) <
Wk
2 . Then mi(R,W) ≤ W
2 and
by monotonicity of preferences the agent would prefer consuming the remaining resources
(W−mi(R,W)) Pi mi(R,W) contradicting the conclusions of Proposition 1.
If no-envy and efﬁciency are normative criteria shared by both agents then, in order to
satisfy these two normative criteria, each agent must receive at least her minimal rights.
Moreover, no matter how we distribute the remaining resources, assigning to each agent
her minimal right guarantees an envy-free distribution. Hence, a natural way to select an
allocation is to assign the minimal rights and then distribute the remaining resources. The
remaining resources along with the agent’s preferences overthe remaining resources deﬁne
anew economy,iftheminimalrightsofthiseconomyare positiveit isonlynatural toassign
them and iterate the process until minimal rights are zero. In the next section we study such
procedure.
3 A selection form the no-envy and efﬁcient set
After assigning to each agent her minimal rights the remaining resources are given by
(W−åi∈Nmi(R,W)) ∈ Rm
+, and the preferences of each agent over these remaining re-
sources are the restriction of her preferences over bundles dominating her minimal rights.
The remaining resources, and the iomplied preferences deﬁne a reduced economy (see Fig-
ure 2).
Deﬁnition 2. For each economy (R,W)∈E the minimal rights reduced economy (or just
reduced economy), rm(R,W), is the economy (R′,W′) ∈E, where:
(i) For each i ∈ N and each xi,x′
i ∈ Xi we have, xi R′
i x′














Figure 2: Minimal rights reduced economy. The economy’s minimal rights are given by (mA,mB).
After assigning minimal rights we deﬁne the reduced economy given by the box(mA,mB) and the implied
preferences over the remaining resources.
(ii) W′ = W−åi∈Nmi(R,W).
After assigning minimal rights, any efﬁcient allocation in the reduced economy will
also be an efﬁcient allocation in the original economy. That is, if an allocation is efﬁcient
for the reduced economy then, after summing to each agent’s bundle her minimal rights,
we obtain an efﬁcient allocation for the original economy.
Proposition 2. For each (R,W) ∈ E an allocation x ∈ P(rm(R,W)) if and only if the allo-
cation (m(R,W)+x) ∈ P(R,W).
Proof. The fact that if (m(R,W)+x) ∈ P(R,W) then x ∈ P(rm(R,W)) is straightforward.
We show the converse holds.
Let (R,W) ∈ E, (R′,W′) = rm(R,W), and x ∈ P(R′,W′). By contradiction assume that
(x+m(R,W)) / ∈P(R,W). Thenthereexistsanallocationx′ ∈P(R,W)whichPareto-dominates
(x+m(R,W)) according to the preference proﬁle R. By deﬁnition of W′ we have åi∈N(x′
i−
mi(R,W))=W′, then, if for each i∈N (x′
i−mi(R,W))>≧0 the allocation is (x′−m(R,W))
is feasible in the reduced economy, and since by assumption x′ Pareto-dominates (x+
m(R,W)) according to the preference proﬁle R, (x′−m(R,W)) Pareto/dominates x accord-
ing to the preference proﬁle R′, but this contradicts the fact that x ∈ P(R′,W′), hence there
11exists an agent i∗ ∈N and a commodityk ∈M such that x′
i∗k <mi∗k(R,W). By Proposition 1
mi∗(R,W) ∈ Pi∗(R,W) and by assumption x′
i∗ ∈ Pi∗(R,W); then, by Remark 2, we have that
m∗i(R,W) > x′
∗i, and by monotonicity of preferences (xi+m∗i(R,W)) Pi∗ x′
∗i contradicting
the assumption that the allocation x′ Pareto-dominates the allocation (x+m(R,W)). Hence,
(x+m(R,W)) ∈ P(R,W)
The intuition behind the proof is the following: if an allocation x0 is efﬁcient in the
reduced economy and the sum of the allocation with the minimal rights (x0 +m) is not
efﬁcient in the original economy, it must be Pareto-dominated by an allocation x1 outside
the Edgeworth box of the reduced economy. Since the efﬁcient set deﬁnes an increasing
curve in the Edgeworth box, the allocation x1 gives to at least one agent a bundle smaller
than her minimal rights, but this contradicts that x1 Pareto-dominates (x0+m).
Once we assign to each agent her minimal rights, how should we assign the remaining
resources? If there is a positive amount of resources remaining, minimal rights of the
reduced economy are positive hence, a natural way of proceeding is to assign to each agent
these new minimal rights and further reduce the economy, and iterate this procedure.
Deﬁnition 3. For each (R,W) ∈ E and each k ∈ N we deﬁne the the k-envy-free and
efﬁcient minimal rights (or k-minimal rights) are deﬁned recursively by:
m1(R,W) = m(R,W)+m(rm(R,W)). fork = 1.
mk(R,W) = mk−1(R,W)+m(rmk−1
(R,W)).15 fork ≥ 1.
Since minimal rights are positve, from Corollary 1 we know that for each agent the
allocations assigning to the agent her k-minimal rights and the remainder to the other agent
are envy-free, now we show that these allocations are also efﬁcient.
Proposition3. Foreach(R,W)∈E,eachi∈N, andeachk∈N, theallocation(mk
i(R,W),W−
mk
i(R,W)) is envy-free and efﬁcient.
12Proof. For each j ∈ N let (Rj,Wj) = rmj
(R,W). Let K ∈ N, by Proposition 1 applied to
the economy (RK,WK) we know that (mi(RK,WK),(WK −mi(RK,WK))) is efﬁcient for the
economy (RK,WK).
By Proposition 2 we have that ((mi(RK−1,WK−1)+mi(RK,WK)),(mj(RK−1,WK−1)+
WK −mi(RK,WK))) is efﬁcient for the economy (Rk−1,Wk−1). Repeated application of











by Corollary 1 the allocation (mK
i (R,W),W−mK
i (R,W)) is envy-free.
Letting the process of assigning minimal rights continue we obtain an increasing se-
quence of feasible allocations, thus it has a limit. This limit deﬁnes the recursive minimal
rights:
Deﬁnition 4. For each (R,W) ∈ E, the recursive envy-free and efﬁcient minimal rights




Our main theorem shows that, not only does the results of Proposition 3 hold in the
limit, but the recursive minimal rights deﬁne an efﬁcient allocation.
Theorem 1. Recursive assignment of minimal rights selects an efﬁcient and envy-free al-
location.
Proof. Let (R,W) ∈ E.
First, we show that at the allocation M(R,W) all the resources are distributed, that is,
åi∈NMi(R,W) = W. For each k ∈ N, let (Rk,Wk) = rmk
(R,W)), we need to show that
Wk → 0. Since Wk = Wk−1 −åj∈N mj(rmk−1
(R,W)) it deﬁnes a decreasing sequence of
non-negative vectors and it has a limit. Moreover, by Corollary 2 minimal rights are pos-
13itive and for each i ∈ N we must have mi(rmk−1
(R,W)) → 0. By Corollary 2 there exists a
commodity l ∈ M such that mil(Rk,Wk) ≥
Wk
l
2 , but these two conditions imply that Wk → 0.
Now we show that M(R,W) is envy-free and efﬁcient. Let i ∈ N, by the previous step
M(R,W)=limk→¥(mk
i(R,W),W−mk
i(R,W)). By Proposition3foreachk∈N, (mk
i(R,W),W−
mk
i(R,W)) ∈ PF(R,W), and since the set of envy-free and efﬁcient allocation is closed,
M(R,W) ∈ PF(R,W).
The intuition behind the proof of the main theorem is straightforward: Since the k-
minimal rights are converging to the recursive minimal rights, then the minimal rights of
the k-reduced economy must be converging to zero. Then, by Corollary 2 the endowment
of the reduced economy must be going to zero, thus the recursive minimal rights distribute
the entire resources. Now, since for each k ∈ N assigning to one agent her k-minimal rights
and the remainingresources to the otheragent is envy-free and efﬁcient, then so is the limit.
4 Conclusions
For most economies there are many envy-free and efﬁcient allocations. We provided a
procedure which selects a single such allocation by strenghtening the concept of envy-free
in a recursive manner. In this paper our focus is not strategic and we do not deal with the
implementationproblem; we offer a solution concept in which the step by step procedure is
justiﬁed on a normative ground. For a given economy efﬁciency and envy-free properties
identify a set of allocations. Hence, even if agents agree on the need for the ﬁnal allocation
to be efﬁcient and envy-free, still they have the problem of selecting one allocation in this
set. Our solution is parsimonius in that it does not rely on the agent’s name or reference
situations and it is only based on a logical consequence of agents’ fairness concern: if
agents agree on evaluating as socially desirable the properties of efﬁciency and envy-free,
they cannot dispute over the amount of resources which is consumed by each agent in all
efﬁcient and envy-free allocations. Therefore, they should also agree on distributing this
14minimum amount, since it is a necessary condition for these two properties being satisﬁed.
If agents do only agree on the normative relevance of the above mentioned properties, they
can uprightly dispute on how to distribute any additional amount of resources. However,
once these minimal rights are distributed, the economy has changed and now agents may
agree on solving this new problem as they did before.
Generalizing our solution to economies with more than two agents has two main prob-
lems. First, envy-free is no longer deﬁned by comparing what an agent consumes to the
remaining resources, but depends on the distribution of the remaining resources among
the rest of the agents. This problem can be solved by asking a weaker no-envy requirement
based on an agent not envying the average amount of resources that the others receive. Sec-
ond, is that for more than two agents the Pareto set no longer describes an increasing curve,
and when deﬁning minimal rights we can proceed in two ways: ﬁrst, by selecting alloca-
tion which are minimal in terms of welfare (but then there may be multiplicity problems or
we run into non-anonymous selections); second, by using the same deﬁnition of minimal
rights in terms of commodities, but then we cannot guarantee the efﬁciency or envy-free of
the selcted allocation. In many economic applications, such as economies with quasi-linear
preferences, division of indivisible goods with monetary transfers (i.e. auction settings), or
cake division problems, the Pareto set is well structured for any number of agents, in these
settings our procedure can be generalized to acomodate more agents.
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